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Resumen
The article discusses the role played by Piedmontese consuls in the US to facilitate the
economic and political integration of Piedmont in the Atlantic world of the post-Restoration
years. It shows that their effort to promote commercial exchanges with the United States often
found strong local resistance but, nonetheless, helped undermine protectionist policies and
international isolation in the following decades.
Furthermore, their quest for Atlantic integration was the ultimate outcome of flexible
adaptations and creative interpretations of the official policies formulated by the political and
diplomatic establishment. This case study, then, prompts further investigation on how consular
networks in Europe and the Americas worked as a connective tissue between state actors and
transnational forces in the shaping of commercial and political relations across the Atlantic
since the first half of the 19th century.
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Atlantic beginnings
In 2004, in a thought-provoking essay on the origins, present state, and future
prospects of Atlantic history, Donna Gabaccia urged practitioners of the sub-field not to
fall prey to “parochial globalism” and challenged them to broaden the geographical
scope and deepen the chronological range of their inquiry. In her view, criticism of the
Atlanticist paradigm by world and global historians which emphasized the connections
and interactions between world regions would not lead to a demise of Atlantic history
but rather to its reconfiguration. The Atlantic did not come to an end as a historical
space and unit of analysis at the end of the 18th Century; rather, “the very changes that
undermined the earlier Atlantic ‘world’ were creating a new Atlantic, with a new
geography, and place in the world” in the 19th Century.1
1
Several years after her case for a new periodization of Atlantic history in the light of
the changing place of the Atlantic in the wider post-1800 world, research on a “long
Atlantic in a wider world” is still the exception, rather than the rule. On the one hand, a
significant amount of the research conducted by world and global historians on the
circulation of commodities, people, and ideas in the 19th Century either does not
embrace, or explicitly rejects, the Atlantic paradigm. On the other, Atlanticist historians
and academic institutions stick by and large to the traditional periodization of early
modern history. This is hardly surprising, given that Atlantic history as we know it is
mostly the outcome of a convergence of three research strands firmly rooted in early
modern history, namely the history of the transatlantic slave trade, the history of
colonial societies in the Americas, and the history of transatlantic empires.2
2
In this essay I discuss, from a peripheric-local, rather than a world-global,
perspective, how the “new Atlantic” that was being shaped in the first half of the 19th
Century − as a consequence of the overlapping of and interaction between technological
advances, trade, the circulation of economic and political ideas, and the geopolitical
framework generated by the Atlantic revolutions, the American independences, and
European Restoration − affected the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont). I assume,
therefore, the time-tested perspective of cis-Atlantic history, which concentrates on “the
history of any particular place − a nation, a state, a region, even a specific institution −
in the wider Atlantic world.” 3 At the same time, I challenge prevailing assumptions
about spatial and chronological range by focusing on how developments in the 1820s
and 1830s started to partially integrate a small, peripheric state of Mediterranean
Europe into the dense network of economic, political, and cultural exchanges spanning
the Atlantic.
3
A turning point of such integration is the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between the US and the Kingdom of Sardinia, signed in 1838, which followed a number
of similar treaties signed by the US and European monarchies since the 1820s and was
the first between an Italian state and an American republic. The treaty, which lead to an
increase in transatlantic trade through the port of Genoa, was a significant step toward
the adoption of liberal economic policies by the Piedmontese government which, in
turn, paved the way for the wider liberal turn of the 1840s and 1850s.4 However, its
premises are, for the purpose of this study, at least as important as its consequences.
Diplomats, consuls and merchants, ideological concerns and commercial opportunities,
technological advances and deep-rooted mental maps concurred to lay the groundwork
not only for the 1838 treaty but also for a more general reconfiguration of the Atlantic
landscape after the Restoration. It is to the early stages of the formation of this
landscape, observed from the vantage point of Turin and Genoa, that we now turn.
4
14/11/12 11:29Trade, Liners, Treaties. Piedmontese Consuls in the Long Atlantic, 1819-1838
Pagina 3 di 15http://nuevomundo.revues.org/63491
A combination of factors “from below” and “from above” connected Piedmont to the
Americas after 1815. While the former have been investigated by scholars working on
the early stages of Italian migration to the New World and on the diasporas of Italian
exiles, the latter are largely ignored. The early stages of migration from Liguria to the
Plata region date back to the end of the 18th Century; however, significant communities
in Buenos Aires and Montevideo and trade routes between Genoa and the Plata region
took shape after the 1820s. In the following decades the Ligurian presence spread along
the Pacific coast in Valparaiso, Lima and eventually reached San Francisco with the gold
rush of the late 1840s, while a few hundred Italians settled in New York, Philadelphia,
and New Orleans.5 Thus, tens of thousands of Ligurian merchants, sailors, artisans, and
exiles had settled in the New World and created links with their homeland which paved
the way for a massive increase in trade and migration in the second half of the
nineteenth century. From the last years of the ancien regime, then, an “American
dimension” gradually became part of the mental maps of Ligurians from different
cultural and class backgrounds, who came to consider the New World as a resource, as
just another option available in their quest for business, political freedom, personal
emancipation, or draft dodging.6
5
Similarly, an American dimension was changing the international outlook of
Piedmont. It was at this time, after the Congress of Vienna, that the former Republic of
Genoa was transferred to the House of Savoy, which was among the most ardent
champions of the legitimist order set up by the great powers of Europe. As a
consequence of this annexation, Turin found itself with an open door to the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic at a time when political and commercial relations
between Europe and the Americas were being reshaped by the “Western question.”7 As
the wave of independences across Latin America was leading to the creation of new
republics and the end of the war between the US and Britain was reopening trade
routes, major European powers competed with each other and with the United States to
gain influence and commercial opportunities in Central and South America. Latin
American leaders, for their part, tried to enlist international support for their fight
against imperial Spain. Furthermore, European concerns about developments across
the Atlantic increased in the late 1810s and early 1820s, when legitimist fears that
subversion and instability might spread from the New World to the Old via Spain were
revived by the liberal revolutions of 1820. At the Aix-la-Chapelle conference of 1818,
Russia and France went so far as to pledge their support for Spain’s ambitions to restore
its rule in the former colonies. Finally, after Britain managed to establish its leadership
in the Atlantic during the early 1820s, attempts by great and small European powers
alike to profit from the re-opening of transatlantic routes continued, while the United
States was going through the “market revolution” of the Jacksonian years and Latin
American nations saw Atlantic trade as an instrument with which to bolster their
domestic stability and pursue their integration into the international system.8
6
Piedmont, whose security and prosperity were closely related to the European
balance of power, found itself involved in this web of commercial and political relations
that was shaping the post-Restoration Atlantic world.  Consequently, following the
example of the major European powers, from 1815 it set out to create a consular
network in the Americas both to monitor the political developments of the Western
question and to open up opportunities for international trade, which was suffering as a
consequence of the Napoleonic wars. The general consulate that was established in
Philadelphia in 1819 remained the center of the consular network until the mid 1830s,
when it was transferred to New York, while consulates in the republics of Latin America
were established from the mid-1830s onwards.9
7
The political and commercial concerns behind these efforts were strongly8
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interrelated, as the instructions of the Piedmontese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
Gaspare Deabbate, the first general consul in the US, aptly show. Deabbate, who served
in Philadelphia until 1825, was required by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Marquis de
San Marzano to negotiate commercial reciprocity, thus ending discriminatory
navigation charges for Ligurian vessels in the US, while ensuring that the same
conditions would be applied to American vessels. The aim was to develop Genoese
direct trade across the Atlantic and placate the anti-Savoy sentiments which were
widespread in Genoa, at a time when the Spanish empire was collapsing, France and the
US were fighting a commercial war, and finally – San Marzano erroneously believed –
tensions between the US and Spain over Florida might precipitate a conflict involving
Britain, thus providing new opportunities for Genoese merchants.10 Deabbate
successfully negotiated with US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams; commercial
reciprocity was agreed upon in 1822 and eventually ratified by the US Congress in
1824.11
At the same time, he was also expected to monitor political and diplomatic
developments in the US and in the Americas. During his tenure he reported and
commented on a wide array of topics including the domestic US political scene, torn by
the crisis over slavery in Missouri and turmoil in Latin American republics; US
recognition of these republics and tensions with Spain over Florida; and finally,
transatlantic relations and competition among European powers in the Americas in the
light of the premises and consequences of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. As was often
the case with general consuls in extra-European posts at that time, the distinction
between the consular and the diplomatic sphere was often blurred in his activity.12
Strictly consular matters like trade policies and the protection of Piedmontese subjects
and interests were part of the larger Atlantic landscape that Piedmont, a second-rank
power in the concert of Europe and a peripheric player in international trade, had
decided it could not ignore.
9
In a long report on the future prospects of Piedmontese trade in the Americas,
requested by the Ministry, Deabbate argued that the volume of exchanges between the
US and Sardinia would easily benefit from reciprocity, especially in terms of duty
differentials, as well as from a network of vice-consuls able to act “like agents” and
surrogate Genoese merchants, which were virtually absent in North America.13 By 1822
consular posts had been established in the major ports of the Atlantic coast of the US
and in New Orleans. He also stressed that much greater benefits would be derived from
indirect trade, with Piedmont acting as a broker between its neighbors and the US.
10
Eventually, Deabbate’s efforts to facilitate trade between the two nations met strong
resistance in economic as well as political circles. The admiralty of Genoa, which
supervised the navy and the merchant marine and was consulted by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on these matters, was sceptical about indirect trade and believed that
making Genoa the hub connecting Mediterranean and Atlantic trade was “illusory,”
given the competition from Marseilles, Leghorn, Venice, and Trieste. Consequently, the
tonnage differentials for American vessels in Genoa were maintained, to protect
national shipping. Futheremore, the Piedmontese government feared that such an
ambitious plan could antagonize its neighbors and endanger its stability and security.
Turin’s pursuit of neutrality in the European balance of power reinforced Genoa’s
commercial isolation.14
11
Finally the American, British, and French merchants serving as vice-consuls could
hardly help to integrate Piedmont into existing North Atlantic trade, given the lack of
Ligurian communities and commercial networks in North America in the 1820s and the
contradictions that marred Piedmontese commercial policies, which wavered between
the tentative pursuit of new markets and a strong allegiance to the traditional
12
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protectionist policies which prevailed through the early 1830s.15 However, Deabbate’s
tenure in Philadelphia has a twofold relevance in this story. At a general level, it
exemplifies how the consular network tried to mediate between the international
dimension of trade policies and treaties, and the transnational dimension of the
circulation of goods and people across the Atlantic, thus providing the connective tissue
for the new Atlantic economy that was being built in the first half of the 19th Century. At
a local level, it anticipates the role that the consular network would play in, and the
domestic opposition it would find to, the integration of Piedmont into the Atlantic
economy in the following years.
When Piedmont established its consular network across the Atlantic, it was following
the lead of the major European powers.16 On the one hand, expanding trade and
influence across the Atlantic required the creation of listening posts and agents with
first-hand knowledge of developments overseas and an ability to negotiate with the
American nations. On the other, the republican character of those nations prevented
their full inclusion into the international system originated by the Restoration, which
was based upon a legitimist notion of sovereignty. What was needed, then, was a de
facto recognition that allowed European monarchies to do business with American
republics without undermining the ideological assumptions behind the balance of
power established in 1815. Since the late 1810s the consular service had provided a
connective network among nations which was just short of formal recognition, and
paved the way for the treaties of commerce and navigation which would regulate
transatlantic trade patterns and help to increase the volume of exchanges from the
1820s. Britain was the leading proponent of these treaties, which were inspired by the
president of the Board of Trade, William Huskisson, an advocate of reforming the
Navigation Acts and of commercial reciprocity. This commercial, rather than
diplomatic, blueprint also suited the Latin American republics and especially the US
which, since John Adams’ Model Treaty of 1776, had tried to avoid formal alliances and
to separate the commercial and the political levels when dealing with European powers.
In the following years most European countries adopted this tool, including Piedmont
in its treaty with the US in 1838.17 It is no accident that Huskisson was also among the
advocates of the reform of the consular service promoted by prime minister George
Canning. The Consular Act of 1825 was an attempt to turn a loose, inefficient group of
individuals serving overseas into an efficient government service; it was also a response
to the dramatic expansion of the British consular network, which went from forty-six
consuls in 1790 to fifty-seven in 1814 and jumped to 107 in 1824 after the opening of
several posts in the newly-independent states of Latin America.18
13
In fact, transatlantic exchanges had already been increasing in quantitative terms and
changing in qualitative terms and, eventually, they shaped a new Atlantic in which
transnational factors (trade, technology, migrations, ideas) were intertwined with the
role played by policy-makers and diplomats on both sides of the ocean. The case of
another Piedmontese consul in the US, Angelo Garibaldi, will show how the rise of this
new Atlantic produced shockwaves which eventually affected Piedmontese policy-
makers’ mental maps and policies in the 1830s.
14
This new Atlantic was by no means self-contained or separated from other world
regions. Practitioners of global history rightly stress the multiple connections between
“the West and the rest” as well as the significant volumes of trade and migration in Asia
and the Pacific in the early-modern era; consequently they question the relative weight
of the Atlantic region in the global context and its role as the source of a model −
Western modern capitalism − which would later spread across the world.19
15
 However, the Atlantic world of the first half of the 19th Century can be studied as a
significant and cohesive unit of analysis for two qualitative, rather than quantitative,
16
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Piedmont as Atlantic periphery
reasons. Firstly, economic historians have showed that the 1820s were a turning point
in the history of globalization due to the sharp decline in transportation costs and,
consequently, in commodity prices which was made possible by the transportation
revolution originated by transatlantic liners.20 While these technological advances were
not exclusive to the Atlantic basin, their big-bang impact on international trade initially
took place along transatlantic routes. In January 1818, a few months before the great
powers of Europe renewed their Quadruple Alliance “strengthened by the ties of
Christian brotherhood” in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, a packet boat of the Black
Ball Lines leaving New York on its way to Liverpool inaugurated the era of regular
freight and passenger services across the North Atlantic. Other companies followed suit
in the subsequent years and, while new destinations were added in the US (Boston,
Philadelphia) and in Europe (London, Hamburg, Le Havre), the ports of New York and
Liverpool continued to play a major role in transatlantic trade, which was based on
cotton, thus replacing ports like Cadiz, Bordeaux, and Nantes which had flourished
before the Napoleonic wars. These regular services offering reliable, timely, and fast
connections dramatically improved communication and transportation across the
Atlantic, and the introduction of steamers between Liverpool and Boston from the late
1830s further contributed to the transformation of the Atlantic into a conduit for the
circulation of goods and people.21  
Secondly, and more importantly, this revolution in Atlantic crossings overlapped with
and was related to various developments which, while seldom considered by the
prevailing Atlantic history paradigm, transformed old Atlantic networks and created
new ones in the first half of the 19th Century. The capitals behind transatlantic liners
were also invested in railroads, again mostly in countries surrounding the Atlantic
basin. Increasing trade and the integration of markets in the North Atlantic brought
with them new business practices and financial services; they also triggered a
circulation of workers which eventually paved the way for mass migration. Finally,
economic and technological transformations had intellectual and political consequences
at a time when advocates of free trade like Richard Cobden revived the eighteenth-
century critique of the idea of the balance of power, deeming it a thing of the past and
arguing that the unlimited movement of goods, people, capitals, and ideas would
inevitably connect the people of the world by peaceful means.22 Free traders were part
of a larger liberal critique of the Restoration which emphasized how the transnational
forces of commerce, travel, and intellectual exchanges were undermining the old order
of European statesmen and diplomats. The opposition between Old World monarchies
and New World republics forged by the Congress of Vienna and the Monroe Doctrine
was being eroded and eventually replaced by a dense network of exchanges in which the
political culture of nationalism played a major role: “In the wake of colonial and
republican evolutions,” Gabaccia writes “ideologies of nation building …attempted to
rewrite Atlantic cultural connections” around the mid-19th Century.23 The history of
19th-century Atlantic connections is, then, also a “history of meaning.”24
17
The story of Angelo Garibaldi, consul of the Kingdom of Sardinia in Philadelphia from
the late 1820s to 1835, exemplifies how these connections not only transformed the core
of the Atlantic world, but also affected its periphery.
18
Information on the elder brother of the hero of the Italian Risorgimento is scarce.
Apparently he was a merchant in New York before moving to Philadelphia, where he
19
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ended up serving in the consular service after he met the general consul Caravadossi de
Thoet, also from Nice, who hired him as Chancellor and Vice-Consul in 1826.25
Notwithstanding the ongoing professionalisation of the consular service, at that time it
was still possible for merchants to serve as consuls, especially in the cases of small
countries having to deal with a shortage of adequate staff in extra-European areas. In
fact, the Piedmontese network in Latin America did not really become effective until the
1840s, when consular officials in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile were replaced by
agents indicated by influential residents of the Ligurian communities who, eventually,
were instrumental in signing commercial treaties between Piedmont and those
nations.26 Thanks to this diverse recruiting base the consular service was a rather
unique blend of individuals from different backgrounds working to promote the
interests of their country of origin, of the communities of merchants and immigrants
they worked with and, not infrequently, of themselves. This enabled them to mediate
between international policies and transnational actors and, again, to provide the
connective tissue that facilitated the integration of the Atlantic economy during the first
half of the century.
Once Caravadossi had left Philadelphia for Marseilles in early 1832 due to illness,
Garibaldi stepped in as Acting Consul and followed in his footsteps. His dispatches
covered economic as well as political matters, including the monitoring of Italian exiles
in the US and throughout the Americas. In fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had
instructed his consuls in North America to report on subversive activities among the
Piedmontese and Italian diaspora in the New World since the early 1820s. Interestingly,
in April 1834 he reported on the activity of a branch of La Giovine Italia, the
organization founded by Giuseppe Mazzini, in Rio de Janeiro.27 In the meantime his
brother Giuseppe, a member of the organisation, left Italy after a failed insurrection
promoted by Mazzini and eventually arrived in Rio de Janeiro in the following year.
However, Angelo Garibaldi was mostly interested in trade and its political implications.
His tireless work to expand commercial relations between Piedmont, the US, and the
Americas went far beyond the duties assigned to him by the Ministry and, not
surprisingly, his efforts were met with strong resistance in Turin and Genoa.
Nonetheless, he anticipated several developments that contributed to the integration of
Piedmont into the Atlantic world from the late 1830s.  
20
Relatively free from the constraints of career diplomats, Garibaldi infused his activity
and his dispatches to the Foreign Ministry with a businesslike attitude and a liberal
political culture that reflected many of the features of the 19th Century Atlantic world.
In 1830 he ventured to draft an extensive, unsolicited report discussing the causes of
the poor state of commercial relations between the US and Piedmont, urging the
government to adopt specific solutions and evoking a triumphant picture of
Piedmontese hegemony in the Italian peninsula as a consequence of the full integration
of Piedmont into the Atlantic trade patterns. His assumptions about economic theory
and his confidence in free trade were made clear from the start by an epigraph which
quoted Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. “Two worlds have been opened to their
industry, each of them much greater and extensive than the old one, and the market of
one of them growing still greater and greater every day.” Writing on the eve of American
independence, the Scottish economist believed that the discovery of the New World had
brought prosperity to the Old and concluded his work by exposing the “cost of empire,”
that is, the damage done by excessive regulation of colonial trade by European colonial
powers. Another influence on Garibaldi’s views was Jean-Baptiste Say, the French
economist and author of the Traité d’Economie Politique (1803) who advocated free
trade and the lifting of barriers. According to the so-called Say’s Law, the abundance of
other products, more than the abundance of money, facilitates sales and generates
21
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wealth; therefore, international trade is instrumental to any increase in domestic
prosperity. Garibaldi combined these economic theories with his first-hand experience
as a merchant and the vantage point offered by the Piedmontese general consulate,
where he was required to keep track of the major economic and political trends between
the US, the Americas, and Europe.28
As he was drafting his “Considerations,” trade between Genoa and North American
ports was virtually non existent. Ligurian merchants were mostly active in the
traditional markets of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, especially after the
1823 treaty with Turkey. In the Americas, Brazil and later Argentina were by far the
most popular destinations of Piedmontese exports − mostly paper and foodstuffs  −
throughout the 1820s; in 1831, 14 Genoese ships reached Brazil and 17 Buenos Aires,
while only 5 reached the US. In the following year, the 19 ships headed to what was
technically defined as “North America” were actually directed to Vera Cruz and to
Caribbean ports (St. Thomas, Santo Domingo, Havana and Trinidad). Similarly,
American ships seldom touched Ligurian shores, and when they did it was mostly on
their way to their final destinations in Sicily and Leghorn, where they loaded profitable
goods like textiles, marble, sulfur, and fruit.29    
22
Garibaldi stressed in his dispatches to Turin that states like the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies and especially Tuscany were successfully penetrating the North American
market and earning a business reputation. On the one hand, he wanted to play on
Piedmontese aspirations to hegemony among Italian states; on the other to show that
commercial opportunities with the US could be expanded if only the old paradigm of
direct trade were replaced by a more ambitious strategy.  Purely bilateral exchanges
between Piedmontese and American goods were unlikely to grow, given that the
Piedmontese economy could hardly compete in the North American and Atlantic
market. However, he argued, the port of Genoa could be turned into a general depot for
goods produced in the Italian states, in South-Western Europe, and in the
Mediterranean basin and destined for the US and the Americas. In fact he envisioned
Genoa playing a leading role in Italian trade with the New World, similar to the role that
New York had acquired for the US and the Americas:
23
Qui peut donc empêcher plus longtems la formation d’un établissement qui, uni aux
advantages naturels a notre marine, permettrait à celle-ci de prendre une part active au
vaste commerce qui se fait au delà de l’Atlantique? Qui peut empêcher la Ville de Genes
de devenir l’ entrepôt général des marchandise italiannes par rapport à l’Amerique, et
l’entrepôt général des merchandise américaines par rapport a l’Italie?30
24
He answered his own rhetorical questions by pointing to two solutions which would
make up for the virtual absence of Ligurian merchants in North America and put an end
to the virtual absence of Genoese merchants in North-Atlantic routes: first, a regular
service of packets between Genoa and New York and, second, a commercial treaty
between Piedmont and the US to overcome local opposition and international isolation.
25
Garibaldi had already explored the possibility of creating a regular service of liners,
with the help of the Sardinian consul in New York, Vincent Bouland, a French merchant
who had been approached by the agents of the company running the New York-LeHavre
line.31 Transatlantic liners, he now insisted, had paved the way not only for a
spectacular increase in the volume of exchanges, but also for a change in consumption
patterns:
26
Non seulement la masse ordinaire des importations européennes a considerablement
augmenté, mais des goûts nouveaux ont été créés en Amérique, avec des articles
nouvellement importés; d’autres, tels queles soyeries de Chine, ont cédé la place à ceux
venant d’Europe, dont la facilitè a se les procurer, résultant du bas fret des navires et de
la promptitude des communications, ont fait perdre aux premiere leur principal mérite,
27
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Une liberté de commerce plus grande que celle dont jouissent ou pourront jouir,
par la suite, les autres Etats de l’Italie attirera dans nos ports la plus grand
partie de leur commerce extérieur; et le premier rôle dans les affaires
mercantiles de cette péninsule contribuera, plus qu’on ne saurait l’imaginer, a
préparer aux Etats de S.M. le premier rôle dans ses affaires politiques – car il
faut bien se pénétres de cette vérité, que l’un de ces deux conditions ne tardera
pas d’amener l’autre: elles sont, pour ainsi dire, inséparables.33
qui est le bon marché.32
Establishing regular connections with New York was necessary in order to overcome
the limitations of direct, bilateral trade and rationalise exchanges with the Caribbean
and South American markets, which were increasingly gravitating toward New York as
a harbour for their trade with Europe. Additionally, once Genoa had become the major
gateway for American goods in the Mediterranean, it could re-export part of them
toward the Eastern Mediterranean, thus making Piedmont a broker between the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic.  
28
Finally, Garibaldi also made it clear that a strong initiative by the Piedmontese
government was required to implement such an ambitious plan, and insisted on its
political implications for the Italian situation. In the conclusions of his “Considerations”
he warned against the commercial activism of Austria in the Mediterranean through
Trieste and Venice and urged Piedmont to take the lead: economic reform which
opened up Genoa to transatlantic trade would eventually set the stage for a “natural”
Piedmontese hegemony on the Italian peninsula. In his view, embracing the free market
and economic reform and reaping the benefits of Atlantic trade would enable this small
state in north-western Italy to be the leading power in Italian affairs, much like Prussia
in Germany:
29
1830 marked the climax of protectionist policies in the Kingdom of Sardinia. It was
also the high point of Piedmontese subalternity to Austria after the July revolution in
France and insurrectional attempts in Italy led the House of Savoy to revive its
legitimist profile, as Charles Albert feared that a new clash between order and
revolution was on its way.34 It is not surprising, then, that Garibaldi’s audacious call for
liberal reform and economic activism was ignored. In fact, in March 1832 he lamented
that his reports had been totally ignored and urged the Minister to take action. The
treaty signed between the US and Turkey in 1831, which threatened to erode the
traditional Genoese influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, gave him the opportunity
to insist thatthe integration of Atlantic and Mediterranean trade was to be taken
seriously.35 When, finally, his insistence persuaded the Ministry of Foreign Affais to
submit his proposal for the establishment of a regular service with New York to the
Chamber of Commerce of Genoa, the protectionist interests which had gained influence
in the previous decades repeatedly rejected it, notwithstanding his reports and
dispatches illustrating in detail the potential benefits for the Piedmontese economy.36   
30
Still, from the early 1830s domestic and international developments were setting the
stage for cautious reform. The July revolution in France, the Zollwerein in Germany and
especially the anti-mercantilist reform movement in Britain showed that the
bourgeoisie was on the rise; the liberal critique of the Restoration mentioned earlier was
gaining strength and undermining protectionist policies across Europe. The expansion
of consular netwotks in extra-European regions and the treaties of commerce and
navigation of the 1820s and 1830s exemplified this growing concern for economic
matters in international politics. The political implications of anti-mercantilism, namely
the confidence that trade would lead to an international order based on peaceful
competition and prosperity, rather than secret diplomacy and war, resonated in Europe
31
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Nos relations avec l’Amérique septentrionale paraîtraient au premier coup d’œil
ne devoir être que des relations purement commerciales, vue la distance qui
nous sépare, mais les distances se rapprochent aujourd’hui par la multiplication
des voies de communication et les rapports sans nombre qui se sont établis
entre l’ancien et le nouveau monde ont créé entre eux une telle complication
and across the Atlantic, as Angelo Garibaldi’s views aptly show, and this new climate of
opinion percolated into Turin and Genoa. Liberal circles began to make their voices
heard in public opinion and intellectuals advocated social and economic progress as a
prerequisite of political reform. Giacomo Giovannetti’s writings on the benefts of the
liberalization of trade apparently influenced  Charles Albert, who gradually
implemented a sort of “autoritharian laissez faire”37 during the 1830s after Tuscany
passed tariff reforms to attract foreign ships to Leghorn and  Austria attempted to gain
access to Atlantic trade via Trieste by signing a treaty with the US in 1831.
A reduction of tariffs in 1835 was the first, cautious sign of this new pattern, but the
turning point came with the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed by Sardinia
and the US in November 1838, which finally introduced the principle of commercial
reciprocity after the false start of the early 1820s. To be sure, the impulse for this
relevant step toward the integration of Genoa into transatlantic routes again came from
the outside. It was the US special representative in Vienna, Nathaniel Niles, who
proposed the agreement to the Sardinian Minister in Austria, mostly to facilitate the
transit through Genoa of American tobacco and cotton directed to the Kingdom of
Sardinia and its inland neighbors of northern Italy and central Europe. This American
move was part of a larger strategy to penetrate the Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern
markets that had been pursued throughout the 1830s during the presidency of Andrew
Jackson. The treaties with Austria, which opened American commerce with Trieste, and
with Turkey, which was seen also as a door to the Russian Black Sea, were responses to
the deliberate efforts of the US the modify its trade patterns, which were strongly
concentrated on Britain and continental Europe, at a time when international
exchanges were an important source of national prosperity.38
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Niles’ proposal found an unlikely supporter in the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Clemente Solaro della Margarita, a strong advocate of reacting against the principles of
liberalism who was well known for his support for legitimist parties across Europe.
However, as the first Piedmontese minister coming from the ranks of the diplomatic
service, Solaro was also a realist. Since his appointment in 1835 he had decided to
create general consulates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, both to protect the interests
of the growing community of Sardinian subjects in the Plata region and to negotiate the
de facto recognition of these South American republics without deviating from the
legitimist principles of Restoration diplomacy.39 In his Memorandum storico politico
(1851) he ridiculed the critics of his opening up Argentina and Uruguay: “the idea that
the King should not recognise them, as if they had been founded by savage tribes, had
not ports to reach and cultivated people with whom to establish relations, was
absurd.”40 In the same vein, he saw the American proposal as a commercial and
diplomatic opportunity. Firstly, he believed that continuing to exclude foreign
merchants from the port of Genoa through duty differentials at a time of widespread
liberalisation in commercial policies and increasing international competition benefited
ship owners, but was detrimental to merchants and perpetuated domestic economic
stagnation.41 Secondly, he maintained that establishing formal commercial relations
with the US had a political dimension which was all the more relevant at a time when
the Atlantic was turning into a conduit between the Old World and the New. In his
instructions to Augusto Avogadro di Collobiano, the first Piedmontese chargé d’affaires
in Washington, Solaro wrote:  
33
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d’intérêt que toute commotion politique qui se prépare ou qui surgit dans l’un
des deux continents doit avoir, nécessairement un grand retentissement dans
l’autre. Les traités de commerce cachent souvent des vues politiques ou du
moins peuvent leur être associés. Il n’est guère permis de douter que les États-
Unis en proposant à sa Majesté un traité de cette espèce n’aient quelque arrière
pensée politique.42  
To be sure, local resistance to the full implementation of commercial reciprocity
continued during the negotiations surrounding the treaty. Protectionist interests among
ship owners opposed the elimination of duty differentials on grain, oil, wine, and spirits.
It was also feared that ending duty differentials on all US imports would leave Piedmont
faced with a dilemma: that of either extending commercial reciprocity to trade with
other nations or being accused of discriminating against them. In the end an agreement
was reached; also thanks to the efforts of the US consul in Genoa, Robert Campbell,
who urged Genoese merchants to lobby against protectionist interest groups.43    
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The immediate impact of the treaty was limited in quantitative terms. The importing
of American tobacco was discouraged by checks and transit charges across Piedmont.
More importantly, reciprocity favored the US, whose economy was on the rise;
Piedmont could hardly compete given its relatively backward industrial sector, while
investments in infrastructures for communication and transport came mostly after the
1840s. While the volume of exchanges in the port of Marseilles more than doubled
between 1838 and 1842, the increase in the trade of tobacco, cotton, and grain through
the port of Genoa was moderate.44
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On the other hand, the agreement with the US was a watershed in terms of its
implications. Firstly, it turned out to be the blueprint for similar treaties with Britain
(1841) and later with France as well as with several South American republics. Secondly,
ending duty differentials, which protected Sardinian shipping in the Mediterranean,
and embracing commercial reciprocity, which was necessary to integrate Genoa into the
expanding networks of international trade, signalled a positive attitude toward the
Atlantic landscape and new trade patterns. Finally, this opening up to international
trade triggered a wider effort to develop the legislative framework and the
infrastructural network which in turn led to the economic dinamism of the Kingdom of
Sardinia during the 1840s and 1850s.45
36
At that time, the influence of liberal, anti-protectionist orientations in the Genoese
business community and in public opinion more broadly was on the rise; the success of
Gobden’s visit to Genoa exemplifies the fact that the cultural and economic stagnation
of the post-Restoration years was being undermined.46 At the same time, other stimuli
from outside Genoa seemed to pave the way for the creation of the regular transatlantic
service that Garibaldi had been advocating since the late 1820s. In 1840 a dispatch from
the Sardinian consul in Marseilles, reporting on the successful launching of a service of
steamers by the Société Mediterranéo-Transatlantique which connected the French
port with the Caribbean and New Orleans, reached Genoa. In the following years,
businessmen like G.B. Venzano and Prandi, ship owners like Lecoq of Rouen and
Lewingston and Wells of New York each approached the Piedmontese government with
similar proposals, only to meet with strenuous opposition from the Genoese Chamber of
Commerce. Finally, the Compagnia Transatlantica was set up in 1852 by the Genoese
ship owner Raffaele Rubattino, with the strong support of prime minister Cavour, to
establish passenger and cargo services to Rio de Janeiro and the Plata region and to
New York. However, marred by mismanagement, financial problems, and the
unfavourable context of the Crimean War, the company shut down in 1857 after a few
trips to South America; the North American route was never activated. To sum up, the
dismal experiment of the Compagnia Transatlantica aptly shows that the full integration
37
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